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Nietzsche and the Morality Critics 253 this claim. But even if the theory does capture what is conceptually central to morality as an everyday cultural phenomenon, a critic may still worry about the effects of the unsystematic, uncodified, unimproved moral beliefs that comprise the daily life of the culture. Such a critique might invite the philosophical rejoinder that the deficiencies of "ordinary" morality simply need to be cured by good philosophy. I shall, in fact, return to this type of objection after we have set out Nietzsche's own critique in greater detail. Recent Anglo-American criticism, in contrast to Nietzsche, has taken as its target moral theory, but it has done so in two quite distinct senses. Let us call the "Theory Critics"-philosophers like Annette Baier, Charles Larmore, Charles Taylor, and sometimes Bernard Williams-those who think that our "particular moral assessments and commonsense moral principles" are not the sort of things about which one should or can have a theory (in some precise and technical sense of the word 'theory').8 The qualification here is important, for the position of the Theory Critics is not a rank anti-intellectualism or some sort of ethical particularism.9 What, then, are the marks of "theory" in this objectionable sense (hereafter Theory)? A survey of the recent literature suggests that a Theory is often characterized by two aims in particular: i) Reduction: Theory tries to reduce all value to a single, unitary source;,1 and ii) Mechanical Decision: Theory tries to articulate an explicit, mechanical decision procedure for generating answers to ethical questions (or explicit criteria for ethical decision and a decision procedure for their application)."
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These pernicious aspects of Theory are closely related, for it is precisely Theory's reduction of value to a single source that makes possible Theory's goal of a Mechanical Decision procedure, namely, one that uses the privileged basic value to "churn out" (we might say) moral directives.'2 Against these aims, the Theory Critics argue that value is not unitary (there is, in Taylor's phrase, a "diversity" of goods) and that (partly as a result) Mechanical Decision procedures are simply impossible in the ethical life: ethical decision and action, these critics say, requires practical wisdom, virtues, or sensitivity to the particular context, all things which (allegedly) cannot be captured within the confines of Theory. Anyone familiar with the recent literature knows that it appears to contain more complaints-and certainly more epithets-than just these: Moral Theory is said to be too abstract, too general, too systematic, too foundationalist, too simplistic, and too contemptuous of nonTheoretical forms of reflection.13 I would suggest, though, that all these complaints are most helpfully thought of as variations on the critique of Reduction and Mechanical Decision. For example, it is because Theory reduces value to a single source that it is too simplistic. Similarly, it is because Theory wants a Mechanical Decision procedure that can generate answers in any particular case that Theory ends up being too general and too abstract.
Focusing the critique of Theory in this way is useful because of a certain tension in the writings of the Theory Critics, for a common refrain among them is that the rejection of Theory (in the technical sense) does not entail the rejection of ethical reflection.'4 But if reflecTheory?" (reprinted in Postures of the Mind, pp. 228-45), esp. in her talk of the theorist's hierarchical ordering of more principles "in which the less general are derived from the more general" ("Doing without Moral Theory?" p. 232) on the model of a legal system ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 214) (where the latter is thought of, in a pre-Legal Realist sense, as involving the deduction of particular decisions from general rules).
12. Taylor aptly calls this the ambition for a "single-consideration procedure," a label which suggests the unity of Reduction and Mechanical Decision, and objects that such a procedure cannot do justice to "the real diversity of goods that we recognize" (pp. 245, 247).
13. See Baier, "Theory and Reflective Practices" and "Doing without Moral Theory?"; and Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, esp. pp. 115-17, 127, 202.
14. For example, Baier argues for ethical reflection without "normative theory in the Kantian sense" while noting that "reflectiveness about our practices requires at the very least noting whether they are counterproductive to their expressed aims" ("Theory and Reflective Practices," p. 226). Williams wonders throughout Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy "why reflection should be taken to require theory" (p. 112) and claims that "philosophy in the modern world cannot make any special claim to reflectiveness" (p. 3). Taylor goes further and concedes that even if there are a plurality of goods, "people ... are faced with the job of somehow making them tion is not simply to lead us back into Theory, then we must have some clear idea of what Theory is-something more than that it is an account of morality that is too simple or too abstract. Indeed, it would seem that if something is to count as reflecting at all-as opposed, say, simply to emoting-then it must aim for some degree of abstraction, simplification, generality, and coherence. To reflect at all must involve abstracting from the particular case and identifying (some of) the general features which permit comparison and harmonizing with other cases. Theory in the objectionable sense must require something else, otherwise all reflection would involve Theory. I have suggested that this something else is captured by the joint aims of Reduction and Mechanical Decision: it is these that mark the line between bad Theory and good ethical reflection.
Yet these considerations suggest something further. For some degree of abstraction, generality, and coherence-the minimal requirements of all reflection-are also surely among the minimal desiderata of all theory construction. In that case, we ought to say that theory in this minimalist sense really is part of ethical reflection. Thus, by ordinary usage, it would be misleading to describe the complaint of the Theory Critics as directed at theory per se, since they only target those theoretical ambitions (i.e., Reduction and Mechanical Decision) that go beyond the minimal requirements. The difference between the Theory Critics and the mainstream of the modern tradition is, ultimately, one of degree, not kind.'5 Those I will call the "Morality Critics," by contrast, are those-like Michael Slote, Michael Stocker, Susan Wolf, and, again, Bernard Williams-who criticize moral theory, not because of its theoretical ambitions, but because of its moral commitments (more precisely, either the substantive content of the morality endorsed or the weight assigned in practical reasoning to moral demands). Admittedly, the Morality Critics often present themselves as critics of morality itself-in that sense they echo Nietzsche-but, on examination, it is clear that their targets are specific theories of morality, consequentialist and deontological. The Williams of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy is illustrative in this regard, for he might seem, at first sight, a counterexample to compatible in their lives" (p. 236) and that, as a result, "the demand for a unified theory" is a "demand we cannot totally repudiate"-(p. 245).
15. This is clearest in the case of writers like Nagel and Larmore, who explicitly affirm both the tenability of moral theory and the indispensable role of something like Aristotle's practical wisdom orjudgment in our moral life. See Nagel, "The Fragmentation of Value," pp. 135-37; and Larmore, chap. 1, p. 151 ("My intention ... has not been to deny the possibilities or importance of moral theory. I do not believe that the complexity of morality is so great, so boundless, that it baffles any attempt at systematization.").
January 1997 this characterization.'6 After all, Williams calls "morality" "the peculiar institution" and says this morality "is not an invention of philosophers ... [but rather] the outlook, or, incoherently, part of the outlook, of almost all of us" (ELP, p. 174). He goes on to worry about the "several natural ways in which" this morality's special notion of obligation "can come to dominate a life altogether" (ELP, pp. 181-82). In passages like these, Williams seems to be objecting not that the best moral theory requires obligation to dominate life, but rather that once moral obligation is allowed to "structure ethical thought" (ELP, p. 182), it has a "natural" tendency to rule out all other considerations. Yet appearances here are deceiving. While Williams plainly wants to align himself with Nietzsche as a critic of morality as a genuine cultural phenomenon-hence the rhetoric about "the peculiar institution" and morality not being "an invention of philosophers"-it is far from clear that the notion of moral obligation he discusses is anything other than a philosopher's "invention" or, at best, such a severe systematic reworking of the ordinary notion as to be only a distant relative of the unsystematic, uncodified notion of obligation actually at work in our culture.
Morality's purportedly threatening notion of "obligation," for example, is constructed by Williams entirely from the works of Kant and Ross, with no gesture at showing what relation their philosophically refined notions of "obligation" bear to those in play in ordinary life. Yet where is the evidence, one might ask, that real people treat "moral obligations] [as] inescapable" (ELP, p. 177) and that they accept the idea that "only an obligation can beat an obligation" (ELP, p. 180)? Surely the evidence is not in the way people actually live, in the way they actually honor-or, more often, breach-their moral obligations, a point Nietzsche well understood.'7 What is the evidence that, in our relativistic culture, individuals think that "moral obligation applies to people even if they do not want it to" (ELP, p. 178)? Even Williams, in leading up to the specter of morality dominating life, says that "the thought can gain a footing (I am not saying that it has to) that I could be better employed than in doing something I am under no [moral] obligation to do, and, if I could be, then I ought to be" (ELP, p. 181, emphasis added). But surely this "thought" might only gain a footing for Kant or Ross, or some other philosopher who followed out to its logical conclusion a deontological theory. It is a pure philosopher's fantasy to think that real people in the moral culture at large find themselves overwhelmed by this burdensome sense of moral obliga-16. I take the preceding sentence to be a more obviously apt characterization of some of Williams's earlier work in ethics.
17. See the further discussion in Sec. V.
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Nietzsche and the Morality Critics 257 tion. Like the other Morality Critics, Williams writes as though he is attacking "morality," when what he is really attacking is "morality" as conceived, systematized, and refined by philosophers. Such a critique may be a worthy endeavor, but it is far different from worrying about the "dangers" of ordinary morality as understood-unsystematically and inchoately-by ordinary people. What, then, distinguishes a Morality Critic from a Theory Critic if both are ultimately talking about moral theory? Roughly, the idea is this: for the former, there is always room, in principle, for a better theory to thwart the criticsm, while for the latter, Theory (in the technical sense) is the heart of the problem, not part of the solution. These points are well illustrated in Stocker's well-known paper "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories."'8 Stocker argues that "if we ... embody in our motives, those various things which recent ethical theories hold to be ultimately good or right, we will, of necessity, be unable to have those motives" (p. 461) and thus be unable to realize the associated goods (e.g., friendship, love, pleasure). Stocker claims, however, that a suitable ethical theory must be one in which reasons and motives can be brought into harmony, such that one can be moved to act by what the theory identifies as "good" or "right." Stocker's point isn't, then, that theorizing in ethics is a misguided enterprise; it's just that we need better theories, ones in which theoretical reasons can also serve as motives for action. Like a Morality Critic, Stocker holds that adherence to morality as it is (read: moral theory as it is) is incompatible with having the motives requisite for certain personal goods ("love, friendship, affection, fellow feeling, and community," p. 461); unlike a Theory Critic, he allows, or at least implies, that a better (i.e., nonschizophrenic) theory could solve the problem.'9
We need, however, a more precise characterization of the Morality Critics, since the preceding account would also capture types of criticism that appear to have no affinity whatsoever with Nietzsche's. Nietzsche's notorious hostility to systematic theorizing-evidenced in his quip that "the will to a system is a lack of integrity" (TI, I, sec. 26)-would seem to make him a natural ally of the Theory Critics. It is true, moreover, that Nietzsche'does not offer a normative ethical theory in the way that Kant or Sidgwick or any other representative of the tradition does.27 Yet Nietzsche's reason for this has nothing 26. Some cautionary notes about the distinction developed in this section between Theory and Morality Critics are in order. There is, of course, a real distinction here, but it may not be as easy to mark as I have so far suggested. Take, e.g., Susan Wolf's remark that "the basic problem with any of the models of moral sainthood ... is that they are dominated by a single, all-important value under which all other possible values must be subsumed" (p. 431). As a freestanding complaint, this could be made by a Theory Critic as well as a Morality Critic: for the former, it would come in the context of an attack on the reductionist aims of Theory based on the real "diversity of goods"; for the latter, it would serve to show that the reason the ("perfect master's") Moral Life is incompatible with the Good Life is that it privileges some type of moral value at the expense of other, nonmoral values. Quite generally, it is easy to see how, e.g., objections to the reductionist aims of Theory based on the plurality of values can quickly start to sound like objections to Morality for wrongly overriding other distinct sources of value. The difference here may only be a matter of emphasis, though it is a difference that is real enough: the Theory Critic invokes the plurality of values to emphasize the inadequacy of a theoretical framework which excludes so much, while the Morality Critic invokes the plurality of values in order to emphasize the costs of morality's OT and to argue against it. The ease with which we might move from one sort of criticism to the other should not obscure the fact, however, that many writers lodge themselves firmly in one camp rather than the other-in fact, only Williams and Foot seem to take both sorts of critical positions. Wolf, e.g., is explicit in distancing herself from any critique of theory per se: "The flaws of a perfect master of a moral theory need not reflect flaws in the intramoral content of the theory itself" (p. 435). Rather, for Wolf, such flaws show only the need for more theory, a theory of "reasons that are independent of moral reasons for wanting ourselves and others to develop our characters and live our lives in certain ways" (p. 437). Lester Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Virtue (London: Routledge, 1991). The difficulties with Hunt's account will serve to highlight the problems confronting this interpretation of Nietzsche. According to Hunt, Nietzsche's theory of virtue is "procedural": "it specifies which traits are virtues by indicating a certain process and declaring that any trait that arises from this process is virtuous" (p. 145). The relevant process is given by Nietzsche's "experimentalism," which requires us to experiment with different goals until we find those which bring about "a complete integration of the psyche" (p. 141), such that "one part of the self imposes order on other, potentially chaotic parts by successfully orienting the subordinate parts towards its own purposes" (p. 128). The traits that are conducive to the integrating goals are, says Hunt, virtues for Nietzsche. There is certainly something broadly right about this picture, though its vagueness is only one of its several problems. First, the theory seems not so much procedural as substantive, since it employs a substantive criterion (integration of the self) for identifying which goal-oriented activities involve virtues. Second, it seems to stretch Nietzsche's ambitions considerably to attribute to him something called a "procedural theory of virtue." Third, Hunt gives almost none of the detail about particular virtues that interest most contemporary writers (including, e.g., Casey), even relegating Nietzsche's own specific virtue lists to an endnote (p. 187, n. 4). While Hunt has a multitude of interesting things to say about Nietzsche, it is not clear that his account makes Nietzsche a virtue theorist of much practical or philosophical help.
28. For a more substantial discussion of these oft-neglected themes in Nietzsche's work, see Brian Leiter, "The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche," in Willing and Nothingness: Schopenhauer as Nietzsches Educator, ed. C. Janaway (Oxford: Oxford University Press, in press).
29. For further discussion, see ibid.
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III. NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF MORALITY
Why does Nietzsche attack morality? I want to begin by setting out in summary form an account that I have developed in greater detail elsewhere.30 Since Nietzsche uses the word "morality" (Moral) in both positive and negative senses,31 I will introduce a "technical" term to mark "morality" as the object of his critique: what I will call henceforth "morality in the pejorative sense" (MPS). All moralities are, for Nietzsche, characterized by a descriptive and a normative component; that is, they (a) presuppose a particular descriptive account of human agency in the sense that, for the normative claims to have intelligible application to human agents, particular metaphysical and empirical claims about agency must be true and (b) embody a normative agenda which creates or sustains the special conditions under which only certain types of human agents enjoy success. Any particular morality will, in turn, be an MPS for Nietzsche if it i) presupposes certain particular descriptive claims about the nature of human agents: for example, that agents act freely and thus are responsible for what they do ("the Descriptive Component"); and/or ii) embodies a normative agenda which benefits the "lowest" human beings while harming the "highest" ("the Normative Component").
Note, first, that these two components are not of equal importance for Nietzsche, for what ultimately defines an MPS as against morality in a nonpejorative sense is the distinctive normative agenda. Thus, while Nietzsche criticizes at length the view of agency that he takes to be implicit in at least certain paradigmatic examples of MPS, he also holds that "it is not error as error that" he objects to fundamentally in an MPS (EH, IV, sec. 7). That is, it is not the falsity of the descriptive account of agency presupposed by MPS, per se, that is the heart of the problem. Thus, strictly speaking, it is true that a morality could be an MPS even if it did not involve a commitment to an untenable In the secondary literature, Nietzsche has been saddled with a variety of different accounts and critiques of MPS.33 A popular thought, for example, is that Nietzsche objects to morality because of its claim of universal applicability.34 Yet Nietzsche never objects to the universality of moral demands, per se, as an intrinsically bad feature of MPS; rather, he finds universality objectionable because he holds that "the demand of one morality for all is detrimental to the higher men" (BGE, 228). Similarly, he holds that "when a decadent type of man ascended to the rank of the highest type [via MPS], this could only happen at the expense of its countertype, the type of man that is strong and sure of life" (EH, III, sec. 5, emphasis added). Finally, consider the illuminating preface to the Genealogy, in which Nietzsche sums up his basic concern particularly well: In these and many other passages,35 Nietzsche makes plain his real objection to MPS: simply put, MPS thwarts the development of human excellence, that is, "the highest power and splendor. . . possible to the type man." This is the very heart of Nietzsche's challenge to morality. But who are Nietzsche's "higher types," these individuals who possess "the highest power and splendor"? Nietzsche alternately calls them "strong," "healthy," and "noble"; conversely, the lowest men are "weak," "sick," and "base." Higher types are also described by Nietzsche as nonreactive, creative, self-disciplined, and resilient; and they evince a Dionysian attitude toward life. Since a detailed exposition of these very general characteristics would take me far afield of my central topics in this paper, I propose to pursue a simpler two-step course.
A. First, Nietzsche provides in his writings two unequivocal and concrete examples of "higher" human beings: Goethe and Nietzsche himself.36 Nietzsche, of course, often expresses admiration for other people-Napoleon, sometimes Caesar, the "free spirits" discussed throughout The Gay Science-but Goethe and Nietzsche himself stand out for the esteem they enjoy in Nietzsche's work. Taking these two, and in particular Nietzsche himself, as paradigm cases of human excellence will make it possible to say something reasonably concrete about the alleged harmful effects of MPS shortly. It will also help emphasize that, whatever Nietzsche's illiberal sentiments, he ultimately admired creative individuals the most: in art, literature, music, and philosophy, "the men of great creativity, the really great men according to my morality"' (WP, 957) . Similarly, in a late note of 1888, he observes (in a passage plainly echoing the preface of GM), "Whoever reflects upon the way in which the type man can be raised to his greatest splendor and power will grasp first of all that he must place himself outside morality; for morality has been essentially directed to the opposite end: to obstruct, or destroy that splendid evolution wherever it has been going on" (WP, 897).
36. I should not be construed here as endorsing the idiosyncratic view defended in the last chapter of Nehamas. According to Nehamas, Nietzsche does not describe his ideal person-his "higher man"-but rather "exemplifies" such a person in the form of the "character" that is constituted by and exemplified in his literary corpus. 37. This type of simplifying move, however, does not obviously help us get a fix on who "lower men" are supposed to be. Yet not saying more about "lower men" is not necessarily problematic for my project here of characterizing Nietzsche's conception of MPS. For the heart of Nietzsche's complaint is simply that MPS has a deleterious effect on higher types (i.e., those who manifest human excellence). It is true that Nietzsche also seems to think that MPS is in the interests of other persons-"lower men"-but this by itself is not objectionable; recall that Nietzsche says, "The ideas of the herd should rule in the herd-but not reach out beyond it" (WP, 287). It is this "reaching out beyond," then, that is at issue because it is this that harms "higher men." If there were a social order in which MPS existed-and in which it served the interests of "lower" types-without having any effects on potentially "higher men," then one would imagine that Nietzsche should have no objections. In that case, one could leave the issue of who "lower men" are pleasantly vague without any cost to the analytical task of getting clear about Nietzsche's critique of morality.
38. So an agent who says, colloquially speaking, "I would gladly lead my life again, except for the time in my thirties when I was ill and depressed," would not affirm life in the requisite sense.
For example, EH, III, Z-1: "The idea of the eternal recurrence, this highest formulation of affirmation that is at all attainable" (cf. BGE, 56).
40. Some writers (e.g., Richard Schacht, Nietzsche [London: Routledge, 1983]) have argued that Nietzsche objects to MPS centrally because it is harmful to "life." The main difficulty with this approach, even as it is typically developed, is its vagueness: as Mark Platts remarks, "Morality versus life is not the best defined of battle lines" (Moral Realities [London: Routledge, 1991], p. 220). I argue elsewhere that when Nietzsche speaks of morality being harmful to "life," he really means harmful to "higher men"; see my "Morality in the Pejorative Sense," pp. 132-34. Other writers (including Schacht again) have suggested that Nietzsche criticizes morality by reference to his preferred standard of "value" as "will to power." I ignore this possibility here, because it seems to make the notion of "will to power" more central to Nietzsche's mature thought than recent What norms, then, comprise an MPS? Nietzsche identifies a variety of normative positions4"-what we may characterize simply as "pro" and "con" attitudes-as constituting the distinctive normative component of MPS. So, for example, a morality will be an MPS if it embraces any one or more of the following sorts of normative views: Three observations about how to understand this picture of Nietzsche's critique are in order: 1. The various possible normative components of an MPS should be construed as ideal-typical: they single out for emphasis and criticism certain important features of larger and more complex normative views. Nietzsche himself remarks that while there is "a vast realm of subtle feelings of value and difference of value which are alive, grow, beget, and perish," we still need "attempts to present vividly some of the more frequent and recurring forms of such living crystallizations-all to prepare a typology of morals" (BGE, 186). In criticizing MPS, we should see Nietzsche as criticizing some of the "frequent and recurring forms" that mark various ideal types of MPS.
2. In characterizing MPS in terms of its "pro" and "con" attitudes, I do not mean to suggest that MPS consists only of such "attitudes": to the contrary, associated with each of these attitudes could be various prescriptive and proscriptive commands, suitable to the plethora of par- 42. Nietzsche only advocates "severe" self-love, i.e., highly critical concern with the self, as the only self-love conducive to the full flourishing of the strong and healthy individual. See EH, IV, sec. 7, and the further discussion below.
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January 1997 ticular circumstances to which such attitudes might be relevant. Yet Nietzsche is typically concerned with the underlying (ideal-typical) attitude-or "spirit -of MPS, rather than the particular rules of conduct. 3. Let us say that that which MPS has a "pro" attitude toward is the "Pro-Object," while that which MPS has a "con" attitude toward is the "Con-Object." Keeping in mind that what seems to have intrinsic value for Nietzsche is "human excellence"-the sort of excellence qua creative genius exemplified by Goethe and Nietzsche, for example-we can say that Nietzsche's criticisms consist of two parts: a) With respect to the Pro-Object, Nietzsche argues either (i) that the Pro-Object has no intrinsic value (in the cases where MPS claims it does) or (ii) that it does not have any or not nearly as much extrinsic value as MPS treats it as having; and b) With respect to the Con-Object, Nietzsche argues only that the Con-Objects are extrinsically valuable for the cultivation of human excellence and that this is obscured by the "con" attitude endorsed by MPS.
In other words, what unifies Nietzsche's seemingly disparate critical remarks-about altruism, happiness, pity, equality, Kantian respect for persons, utilitarianism, and so on-is that he thinks a culture in which such norms prevail as morality will be a culture which eliminates the conditions for the realization of human excellence, the latter requiring, on Nietzsche's view, concern with the self, suffering, a certain stoic indifference, a sense of hierarchy and difference, and the like. Indeed, when we turn to the details of Nietzsche's criticisms of these various norms we find that, in fact, he focuses precisely on how they are inhospitable to human excellence. I want to illustrate this point here with just one example.
According to Nietzsche, the "spirit" of MPS is that happiness is good and suffering bad.43 What, one wonders, could be harmful about this sort of seemingly innocuous valuation? An early remark of Nietzsche's suggests an answer:
Are we not, with this tremendous objective of obliterating all the sharp edges of life, well on the way to turning mankind into sand? Sand! Small, soft, round, unending sand! Is that your ideal, you heralds of the sympathetic affections? (D, 174) In a later work, Nietzsche says, referring to hedonists and utilitarians, "Well-being as you understand it-that is no goal, that seems to us an 43. One problem with this view is that its endpoint-the abolition of suffering and the reign of happiness-is an impossibility because Nietzsche holds that "happiness and unhappiness are sisters" (GS, 338), that we must have both in order to have either. Although the unity of apparent opposites is a recurring theme in Nietzsche, it is not central to his objection to this aspect of MPS. A useful discussion of this theme can be found in Nehamas, pp. 209-11. end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible" (BGE, 225). By the hedonistic doctrine of well-being, Nietzsche takes the utilitarians to have in mind "English happiness," namely, "comfort and fashion" (BGE, 228),44 a construal which, if unfair to some utilitarians, may do justice to our ordinary aspirations to happiness. In a similar vein, Nietzsche has Zarathustra dismiss "wretched contentment" as an ideal (Z, pref. 3), while also revealing that it was precisely "the last men"-the "most despicable men"-who "invented happiness" in the first place (pref. 5).
Thus, the first part of Nietzsche's objection is this: happiness is not an intrinsically valuable end; men who aim for it-directly or through cultivating the dispositions that lead to it-would be "ridiculous and contemptible." Note, of course, that Nietzsche allows that he himself and the "free spirits" will be "cheerful"-they are, after all, the proponents of the "gay science" (cf. GS). But the point is that such "happiness" is not criterial of being a higher person, and thus it is not something that the higher person-in contrast to the adherent of MPS-aims for.
But why is it that aiming for happiness would make a person so unworthy of admiration? Nietzsche's answer appears to be this: because suffering is positively necessary for the cultivation of human excellence, which is the only thing, on Nietzsche's view, that warrants admiration. Nietzsche writes, for example, that art? One might think, in fact, that an MPS could perfectly well allow an exception for those individuals whose own suffering is essential to the realization of central life projects. How, then, does MPS "harm" potentially "higher types"?
IV. NIETZSCHE AND THE MORALITY CRITICS
This question serves as a natural point at which to revisit the apparent affinity between Nietzsche and the Morality Critics. As we saw earlier, these Critics argued that morality, because of its commitment to an impersonal point of view and a corresponding impartial standard of value, will prove incompatible with important personal projects and attachments that we all have: such projects, after all, are just one among many from the moral point of view, and thus may have to be sacrificed when morality demands it. These philosophers then argue that since it would be unacceptable actually to forgo these projects and attachments, we must reject the idea that moral considerations are necessarily the practically determinative considerations, overriding all others: sometimes the Good Life must override the Moral Life.
There are, of course, certain obvious differences between the views of these "Morality Critics" and the Nietzsche we have just explored. As Richard Miller has recently observed,49
Nietzsche often seems to recommend that the constraints of morality be ignored, but it would be a misreading of his intentions to infer that morality ought to be ignored by someone of middling abilities, or a primary interest in family life, or by someone whose characteristic striving is a successful leveraged buy-out. In contrast, the troubling recommendations at the center of current disputes are very broadly addressed. In particular, Bernard Williams' influential warnings about morality are addressed, primarily, to people with normal attachments and their own projects, projects which may be of ordinary sorts. 
This difference in audience is
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January 1997 plainly strike a somewhat different note from Nietzsche, who speaks of morality posing a threat, for example, to "the highest power and splendor actually possible to the type man" (GM, pref., sec. 6); to "the self-reliant, independent, unprejudiced men, the pillars of a strong civilization" (D, 163) ; to "all that is rare, strange, privileged . . . the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, and the abundance of creative power and masterfulness" (BGE, 212); to the "men of great creativity, the really great men according to my understanding" (WP, 957). Here the worry is not merely that the Moral Life will interfere with various mundane personal goods important to us all, but rather that it is incompatible with the highest forms of human excellence: it seems that the Moral Life, for Nietzsche, is not a threat to the Good Life but to the Extraordinary Life. Yet even this difference, we might insist, is really one of degree: for, even if Nietzsche is concerned not with the incompatibility of the Moral Life and the Good Life but rather with the tension between the Moral Life and the Extraordinary Life, he still sqems to join with these Morality Critics in urging that when morality would conflict with certain important nonmoral goods and considerations, morality must sometimes (perhaps for Nietzsche, every time) lose.50
It is this apparent similarity that bears most directly on the Harm Puzzle now before us. For a number of recent writers have argued-contra the Morality Critics-that morality is not incompatible with our various personal projects and attachments, because such projects and attachments can be accommodated within the moral point of view.51 The utilitarian, for example, is interested in producing the 50. Indeed, even among Morality Critics we sometimes hear echoes of the specifically Nietzschean worry, e.g., in the famous Gauguin case, where it is supposed that the Moral Life would undermine "great creativity," or in Wolf's worry that the moral saint cannot achieve "any of a great variety of forms of personal excellence" (p. 426). Moreover, we have already noted that there is clearly an element of extremism running through Nietzsche's critical position; e.g., we can be sure that Nietzsche would not agree with Wolf that a critique of morality does not show "that moral value should not be an important, even the most important, kind of value we attend to in evaluating and improving ourselves and our world" (p. 438). Yet we can live (probably happily) with these differences of degree and still think that Nietzsche joins cause with the Morality Critics, quite broadly, in accepting the truth of IT and rejecting OT.
51. See the literature cited above in n. 25. As we saw earlier, there are really two strands in the responses to the Morality Critics: what we might call "Bullet Biters" and "Accommodationists." Bullet Biters like Conly, Herman, and Baron simply "bite the bullet" on the challenge of the Morality Critics: yes, these writers concede, morality is incompatible with a certain sort of commitment to personal projects-but so much the better, the Bullet Biters claim. For the sort of ability of personal projects to override morality that the Critics envision is not appealing, admirable, or central to a person's character or integrity. By contrast, Accommodationists like Railton, Nagel, and Darwall accept the force of the Critics' challenge but claim that morality can, contrary to IT, greatest amount of happiness possible; if sundering people from their most basic projects and attachments would subvert aggregate happiness, then there can be no utilitarian reason for thinking that the right course of action.52 Our personal projects and attachments are sanctioned from an objective moral point of view, one that takes into account the net effect of having us abandon them every time a more immediate moral demand arises.
Why not think, then, that a similar response will suffice for Nietzsche's challenge? This, of course, is just a variation on the earlier Harm Puzzle. For if suffering will actually facilitate some individual's flourishing, then surely morality can recommend that that person suffer. After all, a prescription to alleviate suffering does not arise in a vacuum: presumably it reflects a concern with promoting well-being, under some construal. But if some individuals-nascent Goethes, Nietzsches, and other artistic geniuses-would be better off with a good dose of suffering, then why would morality recommend otherwise? Nietzsche, like the Morality Critics, falls victim, it seems, to the "objective" point of view embraced by the defenders of morality.
Or does he? In fact, if this response does work against the Morality Critics, it decidedly does not work against Nietzsche's critique: for Nietzsche's, point, we might say, is not about theory but about culture. That is, Nietzsche's idea seems to be that when MPS values predominate in a culture, they invariably affect the attitudes of all members of that culture. If MPS values emphasize the badness of suffering and the goodness of happiness, that will surely have an effect on how individuals with the potential for great achievements will understand, evaluate, and conduct their own lives. If suffering is a precondition for these individuals to in fact do anything great, and if they have internalized the norm that suffering must be alleviated and that happiness is the ultimate goal, then we run the risk that rather than-to put it crudely-suffer and create, they will instead waste their energies pursuing pleasure, lamenting their suffering, and seeking to alleviate it. MPS values may not explicitly prohibit artists or other potentially "excellent" persons from ever suffering, but the risk is that a cul- 
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Ethics January 1997 ture-like ours-which has internalized the norms against suffering andfor pleasure will be a culture in which potential artists-and other doers of great things-will, intact, squander themselves in self-pity and the seeking of pleasure. In sum, for Nietzsche, the normative component of an MPS is harmful not because its specific prescriptions and proscriptions explicitly require potentially excellent persons to forgo that which allows them to flourish-that is, Nietzsche's claim is not that a conscientious application of the "theory" of MPS would be incompatible with the flourishing of higher men. Rather, Nietzsche's claim is that an MPS in practice simply does not make such fine distinctions: under a regime of MPS values-and importantly because of MPS's embrace of the idea that one morality is appropriate for all-potentially higher men will come to adopt such values as applicable to themselves as well. Understand, however, that the claim here is not that Nietzsche could not be forced into the existing paradigms of critiques of moral theory-for example, as Nagel's philosopher who thinks that living well always overrides doing right.55 My claim has been only that this was not really the heart of Nietzsche's critique. Nietzsche was not interested in whether our moral theories could accommodate the Good Life or the Extraordinary Life; Nietzsche was worried whether our culture was making it impossible for anyone to live an Extraordinary Life anymore. It is one of the few themes that animated all Nietzsche's writings from start to finish. In an early essay of the mid-1870s, "Schopenhauer as Educator" (U, III), Nietzsche speaks of "the goal of culture" as "the production of genius" (sec. 6), though there he worries not primarily about the deleterious effect of morality on culture but about "the crudest and most evil forces, the egoism of the moneymakers and the military despots" (p. 4), as well as "the greed of the state" (p. 6). His major work of the early 1 880s, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, begins with Zarathustra's image of a world in which all human excellence and creativity is gone, in which all that will remain is the "last man": Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man.
"What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?" thus asks the last man, and he blinks.
The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small.... "We have invented happiness," say the last men, and they blink. They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth....
No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse. "Formerly, all the world was mad," say the most refined, and they blink.
One is clever and knows everything that has ever happened: so there is no end of derision. One still quarrels, but one is soon reconciled-else it might spoil the digestion.... "We have invented happiness," say the last men, and they blink. (Z, prologue, sec. 5) 55. Indeed, one might pick out various points where the Morality Critics seem to echo Nietzsche. Compare Wolf: "A moral saint will have to be very, very nice. It is important that he not be offensive. The worry is that, as a result, he will have to be dull-witted or humorless or bland" (p. 422); cf. BGE, 260: "the good human being [according to slave morality] has to be undangerous ... : he is good-natured, easy to deceive, a little stupid perhaps, un bonhomme. Wherever slave morality becomes preponderant, language tends to bring the words 'good' and 'stupid' closer together."
Ethics
In the last man, we encounter all the distinctive norms of MPS: the last man embraces happiness, comfort, peacefulness, neighbor love, equality. As a result, the last man can only ask, "What is creation?" thus signaling the distance between him and any type of human excellence, for, as Zarathustra says later, "the great-that is, the creating" (Z, I, sec. 12). Finally, in his last productive year, 1888, Nietzsche speaks of Christian morality as having "waged war unto death . .. against the presupposition of every elevation, of every growth of culture" (A, 43), and he claims that acting in accord with what "has been called morality'' "would deprive existence of its great character" (EH, IV, sec. 4). The distinctively Nietzschean worry, then, is that our moral culture-not our best moral theory-is ushering in the reign of the last man, of complete mediocrity and banality.
Even granting that Nietzsche's attack is ultimately a culture critique, rather than a theoretical critique, one might still insist that it has an important theoretical component. After all, Nietzsche does call for "new philosophers ... spirits strong and original enough to provide the stimuli for opposite valuations and to revalue and invert 'eternal values"' (BGE, 203). Could we not find here the real commonality of interests between Nietzsche and the Morality Critics? For aren't both "philosophers" who challenge the overridingness of moral considerations, who reconsider the value of letting moral considerations dominate all others?
One difference, which we have encountered several times before, is one of degree: as Nagel's appropriation of Nietzsche aptly suggests, Nietzsche's position within the debate framed by the Morality Critics is far more radical, seeming, as it does, to assign complete priority to the Good (or Extraordinary) Life over the Moral Life. Nietzsche, on this picture, really is "inverting" prior values, while the Morality Critics are, at best, calling for a slight turn away from the hegemony of the Moral Life.
Yet again, the difference cuts more deeply than this, for the grounds on which moral values are to be revalued are different. For Nietzsche, they are essentially empirical, growing out of his claim that in a fully moral culture no one will be able to lead an Extraordinary Life.56 For the Morality Critics, by contrast, the claim is theoretical, 56. The reader may wonder in what sense Nietzsche's claims are empirical, since they are hardly the upshot of systematic investigation into, say, the psychology and etiology of genius. They are empirical, however, in the sense that Nietzsche seems to have reached these conclusions from certain sorts of observation: first, and most important, of himself and his own development (note that the theme only appears in his work in the very late 1870s, when he is about thirty-five and has already been ill for several years); second, of various historical figures and cultures with which he was namely, that even an optimal moral theory would still require its perfect adherent to forgo aspects of the Good Life. Thus, the "revaluation" envisioned by the Morality Critics-even ignoring its more modest aims-starts (and ends) within theory, while Nietzsche's starts from a cultural diagnosis (namely, the cause of our cultural mediocrity-of the absence of genius-is our morality) and ends with a cultural prognosis (namely, our moral culture will gradually yield a society of "last men").
V. NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
If the Morality Critics are right, then we have failed in our attempts to produce an ethical theory that could tell us how to live both well and rightly. It is decidedly not an upshot of their critique, however, that, as a matter of fact, we cannot or do not live well: if Utilitarianism, in theory, alienates us from our projects, in reality it goes without saying that it has no such effect. In the culture at large, hardly anyone knows what Utilitarianism is, let alone observes its strictures to the extremes that would lead one to worry that it "demands too much."57 (The same might, of course, be said about deontology, as noted earlier in the discussion of Williams.) The Morality Critics have shown that the enterprise of moral theory is in a bind, unable to resolve the competing demands of the Good Life and the Moral Life; they surely haven't shown that people don't lead Good Lives.
With Nietzsche things stand differently. If the Nietzschean critique is right, then we are supposed to be confronted with something very real: our untutored morality, the morality of ordinary men and women, the morality that infuses our culture is, in fact, an obstacle to human excellence; the price of our moral culture is a culture of banality and mediocrity, one in which Zarathustra's "last men" predominate, in which "things will continue to go down, to become thinner, more good-natured, more prudent, more comfortable, more mediocre, more indifferent" (GM, I, sec. 12).
It would be neither surprising nor unreasonable for AngloAmerican philosophers to express doubts about their competence to undertake or assess such a critical project: such a "philosophical" undertaking-if that is what it deserves to be called-brings to mind a very different conception of philosophy, in which reflection is manifestly not a priori and analysis is not merely "conceptual" or, in this post-Quinean world, simply the a posteriori handmaiden of the natural acquainted through his studies and reading. As I note at the end, though, the case for his critique really requires a more sustained empirical examination. 57. Compare Annette Baier's complaints about the irrelevance of moral theory, of its "construction of private fantasy moral worlds" ("Doing without Moral Theory?" p. 235; cf. p. 234).
Ethics
January 1997 and social sciences. In its Nietzschean incarnation, philosophy quickly crosses the line into psychology, cultural anthropology, and social critique-territory now occupied (regrettably) almost exclusively by literary theorists. This conception of philosophical practice, of course, has always been more common on the European continent. Indeed, it is this conception of philosophical practice that binds Nietzsche most closely to the philosophical tradition on the Continent, since he shares none of the metaphysical ambitions of the German Idealists before him and none of the phenomenological scholasticism of many of those who followed.58 It also has much to do with why the writings of Nietzsche resonate so widely in the intellectual community, while they are often thought rather suspect in the Anglo-American philosophical world.
Yet surely some doubts about the sweep of the Nietzschean criticism are warranted. I should like to conclude with four observations on this score.
1. A natural reaction the philosophical theorist might have to Nietzsche's critique was mentioned earlier: for surely, the theorist might say, what the Nietzschean critique really shows is that our cultural practices need to be corrected by moral theory. For if the best moral theory could, as some of the respondents to the Morality Critics have argued, accommodate the Good Life (perhaps even the Extraordinary Life), then we simply need to bring our moral culture more in line with our best moral theory. The proper response to the Nietzschean critique is not despair about morality but a healthy dose of moral philosophy.
One might wonder, of course, how realistic it is to think that our cultural practices will be reformed by the labor of philosophers. As Thomas Nagel remarked rather frankly a number of years ago, "Moral judgment and moral theory certainly apply to public questions, but they are notably ineffective."59 If there is little reason to think that moral theory will have any effect outside the academy-certainly there is little evidence to suggest otherwise-then holding out the prospect of moral theory can hardly assuage the worries of a cultural critic.60 58. Gilles Deleuze aptly calls phenomenology "our modern scholasticism" in Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. H. Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 195.
59. Nagel, Mortal Questions, p. xii. 60. One might worry, though, that such a complaint will backfire against Nietzsche, for isn't he a "theorist" of sorts, hoping to affect cultural practice? The answer, I think, is that Nietzsche is an esoteric moralist, hoping to reach only a few select readers, those "predisposed and predestined for" his insights (BGE, 30); thus he aims not to reform culture but to enlighten a select few to the dangers of the dominant moral culture. This is why, contrary to a large amount of recent literature, Nietzsche does not have any political theory or any real politics. I hope to address these issues, however, elsewhere. today and attend communion?" (A, 38). Clearly this Nietzsche is under no illusions about the extent to which public actors do not act morally. Indeed, Nietzsche continues in even more explicit terms: "Every practice of every moment, every instinct, every valuation that is translated into action is today anti-Christian: what a miscarriage offalseness must modern man be, that he is not ashamed to be called a Christian in spite of all this!" (A, 38) . What, then, is going on here? If Nietzsche is not, contrary to Foot's suggestion, embracing the absurd view that there is too much pity and altruism in the world, what exactly is his critical point?
Nietzsche's paradigmatic worry seems to be the following: that a nascent creative genius will come to take the norms of MPS so seriously that he will fail to realize his genius. Rather than tolerate (even welcome) suffering, he will seek relief from hardship and devote himself to the pursuit of pleasure; rather than practice what Nietzsche calls "severe self-love" and attend to himself in the ways requisite for productive creative work, he will embrace the, ideology of altruism and reject "self-love" as improper; rather than learn how to look down on himself, to desire to overcome his present self and become something better, he will embrace the prevailing rhetoric of equality-captured nicely in the pop psychology slogan "I'm OK, you're OK"-and thus never learn to feel the contempt for self that might lead one to strive for something more. It is not, then, that Nietzsche thinks people practice too much altruism-after all, it is Nietzsche who notes that egoistic actions "have hitherto been by far the most frequent actions" (D, 148)-but rather that they believe too much in the value of altruism, equality, happiness, and the other norms of MPS. It is the prevalence of the MPS ideology that worries Nietzsche, for, even if there is neither much altruism nor equality in the world, there is almost universal endorsement of the value of altruism and equality-even, notoriously (and as Nietzsche seemed well aware), by those who are its worst enemies in practice. Nietzsche's claim is that a culture which embraces the ideology of MPS, even if it does not act in accordance with this ideology, presents the real threat to the realization of human excellence, because it teaches potential higher types to disvalue what would be most conducive to their creativity and value what is irrelevant or perhaps even hostile to it.
Nietzsche's point here is, I think, a subtle one, for surely it makes sense that individuals of great creativity, and sensitivity are far more likely to take seriously the ideology of MPS than the politicians whose hypocrisy Nietzsche derides in the remark quoted earlier.65 As 65. To say that they take the demands of MPS "seriously" is not to say that they understand them in the way a philosophical theory would; it is only to say that they Ethics January 1997
Nietzsche observes at one point, "What distinguishes the higher human beings from the lower is that the former see and hear immeasurably more, and see and hear more thoughtfully" (GS, 301). But it is precisely this trait of the "higher human beings" that makes them all the more susceptible to the deleterious effects of MPS: a thoughtless brute is hardly likely to worry about the morality of his acts, but neither is he likely to become a creative genius. But the higher types that Nietzsche worries about are both likely candidates for critical selfreflection in light of the norms of MPS and, at the same time, those for whom such norms are most harmful. Indeed, we might say that it is precisely Nietzsche's aim to help these higher human beings "see and In each case, we see that the thrust of the worry is that higher types will come to evaluate and think of themselves in terms of the concepts peculiar to MPS (and Christianity)-that they will become "imprisoned among all sorts of terrible concepts"-with the result that they will be cast into self-doubt and a destructive self-loathing, and thus never realize the excellences of which they are capable.
His general point is perhaps most strikingly put in a very Calliclean passage from Beyond Good and Evil:
The highest and strongest drives, when they break out passionately and drive the individual far above the average and the are more likely to take these unsystematic and inchoate demands constitutive of morality as weighing seriously upon them.
